

Systematization of the reasons for the failure of most socialist projects*

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Let us summarize the results of the review of the greatest historical breakthroughs, unforgettable feats accomplished in the twentieth century by the communists and working people of the USSR and, following their example, after the Second World War, of many other countries, an overview of the enormous achievements in the initiated movement towards the transition to the highest phase of communism and -along the way- considerable mistakes, theoretical and practical perversions, made along the way. The negative factors, alas, turned out to be stronger and interrupted the development of most socialist projects. The systematization of the causes of failure will be the natural conclusion of the essay of our dramatic 74-year history.

Two preliminary remarks, one of which is a reminder: We have repeatedly stated in our analysis that objective reasons tend to be intertwined with subjective reasons. The second remark boils down to explanation: The list of reasons is purely chronological. The fact is that, regardless of the significance of the error, each new

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wrong decision intensifies the inhibition of development in the intended direction, bringing it closer to a dead end.

The initial, **objective** difficulty that the Bolsheviks faced immediately after the brilliantly carried out October Uprising was not unexpected - the significant industrial, scientific, technological, and cultural backwardness of Russia. This fully corresponded to the scientifically grounded Lenin's prediction that the imperialist chain would break through in its weak link. Realizing the categorical necessity of overcoming this backwardness as quickly as possible, the government headed by Lenin, with a general shortage of basic necessities, did not spare the scarce resources available to create powerful scientific centers. The priority of the development of fundamental and applied science for a long time remained a defining feature of Soviet domestic policy.

The **subjective** collective mistake of the party leadership, including V. I. Lenin, was that it remained unchanged Party Charter when the Eighth Congress of the RCP(b) adopted a new, Second Party Program. Rosa Luxemburg's wise warnings were not heeded. Later, this became the **objective** reason for the transformation of democratic centralism into bureaucratic centralism.

In 1921, VI Lenin recognized the party's collective **subjective** mistake of delaying the surplus appropriation system, or "military communism", which complicated the relationship between the working class and the peasantry, instilled a mood of a certain distrust to the Bolsheviks in the countryside, which at first widely supported the slogans of October, especially "Land for the peasants!". The X. Congress, which adopted the NEP, "seriously and for a long time" (!), corrected this mistake.

Early 1922. Agreeing with the need to introduce the post of general secretary in the Central Committee of the RCP (b), V.I. Lenin made by this a mistake, trusting the recommendation of L.B. Kamenev to appoint I.V. Stalin on this post. Lenin's realization of this **subjective** mistake came relatively quickly, and at the end of December of the same year, he was preparing a closed *Letter to the Congress*, in which he recommends removing Stalin from the post of general secretary. However, Stalin manages to strengthen his position in the governing bodies of the party during the first year of his tenure as general secretary that the Thirteenth Congress (1924), the first congress after the death of V.I. Lenin, does not accept the recommendation of the outgoing founder of the party. Stalin remains at the head of the entire party apparatus. This consolidates the victory of the bureaucratic tendency over the democratic one, which becomes the **objective reason** for the beginning of the process of the bureaucratic degeneration of the CPSU (b) -KPSU.

This process, fatal to socialism, was aggravated by the erosion of the class, proletarian composition of the party. In 1925, the announced so-called Leninist appeal diluted the CPSU (b) with a large number of poorly trained and poorly educated cadres. In 1927, the NEP was stopped. Lenin's "seriously and for a long time" shrank to 6 years. And it was far from being "serious". The collectivization of

the village, which began in 1928, was largely violent, which radically contradicted the demand of V.I. Lenin - it is imperative to observe the principle of voluntariness of collectivization. In general, we can conclude that the end of the 1920s was marked by the disregard of the leadership of the CPSU (b) of Lenin's political testament, embodied in his works of late 1922-early 1923, the leitmotif of which sounds a persistent warning about the two main dangers threatening Soviet power - great-power bureaucracy and great-power chauvinism nurtured by centuries of monarchical absolutism. Ignoring this warning **objectively** served to psychologically consolidate the correctness of the party's course in the class consciousness of the victorious proletariat: Yes, they say, Lenin is dead, but Stalin is at the helm, "the successor of his cause, Stalin is Lenin today."

1934, XVII. Congress of the VCP(b). The main theme is the results of the first five-year plan, successes and new tasks in the process of industrialization of the country unfolded by the party. But when the congress, which later received the name "Congress of Winners", came to an end, to the election of the central bodies of the party for a new term, a situation arose unexpectedly for the counting commission: about 20% of the delegates, i.e. about 200 people, have crossed I.V. Stalin out from the ballots for the Central Committee election. The chairman of the counting commission reported to the general secretary about this before the official announcement of the results. In the official protocol against the name of Stalin, there were 3 votes, the same number as against S.M. Kirov. Was it not this event that took place at the final sessions of the "Congress of Victors" that served as an incentive to intensify the propaganda of the absolutely anti-Marxist thesis "on the intensification of the class struggle as we move in the socialist direction," first put forward by Stalin back in July 1928? This **subjective** "contribution" to Leninism became the theoretical "basis" of the Great Terror of 1937-38. The atmosphere of fear that was incompatible with socialism that enveloped the country and, most importantly, the physical destruction of practically the entire broad active of the Leninist party was the **objective** result of that **subjective**, to put it mildly, Stalin's mistake. In turn, this meant that in 1938 the history of the Bolshevik Leninist party was **objectively** completed and, under the same name, the party of the Stalinist dream became a political subject, "a kind of order of the sword-bearers."

1936-39. The most acute contradictions in Soviet society. On the one hand, pride in the Motherland, the Soviet Union, providing comprehensive internationalist support to Republican Spain in its struggle against the fascist rebels of General Franco, who receive assistance from fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. On the other hand, in 1937-38, there was a fear of the coming of every night, which could be the last in general, or at least for many years of separation from the family. This by no means dialectical contradiction inflicted deep moral and political trauma on people. And **objectively** it did not contribute to their rallying in the development of socialist principles.

1941-45. The Great Patriotic War, the indescribable feats of Soviet people at the front and in the rear, the feats of cities that shook the whole world, the defense

of Leningrad, which endured the horrors of the blockade, the Stalingrad Battle, and finally the Victory - all of this tremendously raised the authority of the Soviet Union, Stalin personally as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, raised also the authority of the European Communist Parties, organizers of Resistance movements in the occupied territories. The **subjective** hopes of the main subjects of social development -the proletariat and workers of all social strata- have merged together and, accordingly, the **objective** possibilities of restoring the country's economy and further systematic development, without returning the threat of violent methods from the authorities.


1948 – March 1953. It would seem that Stalin should have taken advantage of such a mass mood of hope and emerging confidence in his absolute power. At first, the first 2-2.5 years after the Victory, this trust was strengthened thanks to the confident actions of the USSR government. There was a rapid economic recovery, the well-being of the population grew, the prices for food and basic necessities fell. But suddenly some kind of paranoia seized the leader. One after another, campaigns were launched aimed at creating a mood of hostility among the masses towards various circles of the Soviet intelligentsia: The “case of doctors”, the fight against “cosmopolitanism” (forgetting that it can be both bourgeois and communist - Marx called himself a cosmopolitan), the defeat of genetics, domestic biology from the leading positions in world science, persecution of cybernetics, which served as the basis for the lag in IT technologies that has not yet been overcome, a series of resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU on literature, cinema, music And the “Leningrad case”, which was a repetition of state terror with execution practically without trial, but only at the direct command of Stalin, 26 leaders of the city party organization, including all five leaders of the city during the blockade, and camp terms for about 300 heads of enterprises and universities ... Economy Faculty of Leningrad State University remained for some time without a single professor. Naturally, in the circles of the intelligentsia, including the students, and in party circles, an attitude of rejection from such a leadership, from such a party, from such “socialism” arose and grew stronger. So the **subjective** features of the autocratic leader of the state, called Soviet, socialist, **objectively** generate in him the forces of resistance to such power, to such a system. And these forces of resistance differ in nature: Some are left, others are right.

1953-56. Death of Stalin, showdown in the Presidium of the Central Committee, arrest and execution of Beria, XX. Congress. The shock from the report of N.S. Khrushchev, who revealed the scale of the crimes committed in the pre-war and post-war years on the background of the personality cult of Stalin, was gigantic. Both in the USSR and abroad, especially in the Communist Parties. But objectively, the XX. Congress of the CPSU gave rise to hopes for recovery.

1956-62. Optimism is the dominant feature in the moods of the peoples of all the republics of the Soviet Union all these 6 years, which have been called the “thaw”. New names of factory innovators, foremen who come to lagging brigades in order to eliminate the lag in a short time, are noted by newspapers, radio, TV

channels, newsreels, scientific breakthroughs, and the USSR is the first in space! 1957, October - the first satellite, April 12, 1961 - the first man in space, and this is a Soviet man. Literature, theater, and cinematography demonstrate a colossal rise. But all this relative freedom, “freedom with shouts” (of the same Khrushchev), ended abruptly in the June days of 1962 with the Novocherkassk execution. It is striking that the representatives of the party-state leadership, who only six years ago exposed Stalin’s crimes, found it possible to repeat the same thing. The Novocherkassk tragedy vividly demonstrated the unacceptable separation of the upper nomenklatura from the working class, whose interests it is called upon to defend. And this is one of the **objective** reasons that the bulk of the workers did not defend the Soviet socialist project in 1991.

1966-70. Successfully launched reforms in Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia owe a subjective factor, proactive and strong-willed leaders: Yanosh Kadar, Alexey Kosygin, Alexander Dubchek. The shameful entry of the troops of the USSR and several states of the Warsaw Pact into the territory of Czechoslovakia, as well as the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU to terminate the provisions of the Kosygin reform from 1971, **objectively** proved a high degree of bourgeois-bureaucratic degeneration of the majority in the leadership of the Soviet Union, ignoring Lenin’s plans concerning the socialist transition to communism.



RedMed and Christian Rakovsky Centre on the move!




RedMed (short for Red Mediterranean) was, until recently, a web site that published news, opinion, commentary and political declarations from around the Mediterranean Sea, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Black Sea region, Transcaucasia, and the broader Eurasian region. It has now been transformed, as of the beginning of 2020, into a centre for propagating socialist thinking, carrying commentary and political statements and publishing various journals from the Mediterranean region all the way to Russia and the former Soviet Union.

RedMed used to work hand in hand with the Balkan Socialist Centre Christian Rakovsky to establish links between socialists and revolutionaries from these regions. However, parallel to the expansion of RedMed, the Christian Rakovsky Centre also broadened its remit. Over time three Russian organisations became members of the Christian Rakovsky Centre: the OKP (United Communist Party), the RPK (Russian Party of Communists), and the Association “Soviet Union”, in addition to the original members, two political parties of two Mediterranean countries, EEK (Workers Revolutionary Party) of Greece and DIP (Revolutionary Workers Party) of Turkey. Thereupon the centre changed its name to the International Socialist Centre Christian Rakovsky.

RedMed is now publishing on a bimonthly basis both the Communist of Leningrad, journal brought out for quite some time in Russian by the RPK, and Soviet Renaissance, a new online journal in Russian prepared by the Association “Soviet Union”. This is in addition to its already established commentary and political statements on world affairs in many different languages, first and foremost in English, but also French, Italian, Greek, Turkish, Russian, Farsi and Arabic.

RedMed welcomes letters, comments, news about struggles, debates and material in different languages. We would appreciate very much if people would volunteer translating the different articles and declarations that we publish in the web site into their native tongue.

Let us join hands to bring down the yoke of imperialism and capitalism in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East and North Africa, and across the world.

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